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ABSTRACT  
This study is focused on the linkages between the legislative families as descriptors of national legislative 
systems and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). We consider such analysis as a case study for the more general issue of explaining the 
preferences of national regulators in the adoption of foreign norms, rules, standards and practices. By using a 
dataset of 162 jurisdictions and dummy variables designed to capture the current stage of IFRSs adoption and, 
respectively, the taxonomy of their legislative systems, we find that a full IFRSs adoption is more likely to occur 
in countries which have principles-based on legislative mono-systems. In addition, we observe that a strong rule 
of law, with an effective mechanism of property rights reinforcement, as well as the pre-adoption existence of a 
pro-growth set of public policies can contribute to the encouragement of IFRSs adoption. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the context of the existence of transnational regulatory entities and of deepening globalization 
processes, the national regulators face several problems in the adoption of exogenous norms, rules, 
standards and practices. The preferences of such bodies for accepting / rejecting or adjusting them 
vary according to a complex set of institutional behaviour determinants. Among them, the constitutive 
and functional characteristics of the domestic legislative structures and institutions have an important 
role. This study is focusing on the possible linkages between the adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and the national legislative taxonomy. There are several 
advantages in analysing the IFRSs adoption as a case study for foreign standards assimilation 
mechanisms and influence factors in different autochthonous economic, politic, social and cultural 
systems. A list of such gnoseological advantages that can be achieved by studying the particular case 
of IFRSs adoption in order to provide some insights about the acceptance mechanisms for 
international regulations, standards and practices, far to be exhaustive, can include: the specific 
approach of IFRSs as principles-based standards; the fact that IFRSs are issued and promoted by 
transnational entities but reflect some national practices from developed economies; the heterogeneity 
of individual adoption situations; the eventual conflicts between these international standards and 
national regulations and practices;  the existence of an ongoing process of international accounting 
harmonization driven by globalization forces etc. 
Currently, there is a growing literature studying the possible interrelations between IFRSs adoption 
and the distinctive features of national legislative institutions and mechanisms. For instance, a study of 
Hope et al. (2006) finds that those countries which have weaker investor protection mechanisms are 
more likely to adopt IFRSs. Their evidence also shows that jurisdictions that are perceived to provide 
better access to their domestic capital markets are more likely to adopt IFRSs. Krivogorsky et al. 
(2010) provides compelling evidence that jurisdictions and national levels of bureaucratic formalities 
in business are factors that modify company likelihood to adopt IFRSs early. 
Analysing the market reactions to IFRSs adoption in Europe, Armstrong et al. (2008) find that the 
reaction is less positive for firms resident in code law countries, consistent with investors’ concerns 
over enforcement of IFRSs in those countries. Ball et al. (2000) provide some empirical evidence that 
code law countries links accounting income directly to current payouts (to employees, managers, 
shareholders and governments). Consequently, code law accounting income is less timely, particularly 
in incorporating economic losses. Regulation, taxation and litigation cause variation among common 
law countries. Also, Ball et al. (2003) consider the cases of Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand, in all of which accounting implementation was expected to be influenced (positively) by 
common (rather than civil) law. On the same line of argumentation, Ball (2006) identifies some 
problems associated with transferring accounting standards from common law to code law, especially 
with regard to countries that have less respect for protecting shareholders value and minority rights. 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) document that earning management is more pronounced in countries with 
weaker legal systems and enforcement. To the same conclusion also comes the study of Leuz et al. 
(2003) which is concluding that weak outsider protection and private control benefits create incentives 
to manage earnings. Ramanna and Sletten (2009) using 102 non-EU countries find that countries with 
“moderate” governance standards have a higher IFRS adoption rate than those with “advanced” 
governance standards. 
This paper seeks to provide two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it adopts a more 
detailed perspective in defining the legislative families based on Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa 
with the help of the Supreme Court of Canada Library data on “world’s legal systems”. Secondly, it 
checks the robustness of our findings by considering other possible explanatory variables as well for 
the countries’ relative preferences in IFRSs adoption for listed companies. 
Our arguments can be resumed as follows: 1) the relative preference for professional decisions of legal 
authorities based on precedent customs and practices versus detailed regulations can be seen as 
separation criteria between different types of legislative families adopted by individual countries and 
2) a major feature of IFRSs consists in the fact that these are a set of principles-based standards. As 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (2006:1) notes: “Principles-based accounting standards 
are based on a conceptual framework, consist of a clear hierarchy of overriding principles and contain 
no ‘bright-line’ or anti-abusive provisions. Such an approach requires the use of judgment by prepares, 
auditors and regulators.” Such key role of professional judgment facilitates the adoption of IFRSs in a 
societal environment in which customs shapes actual decisions. Thus, the IFRSs will be easier adopted 
in countries in which the general legislative framework is more oriented toward the practices-based 
decisions, being guided only by a simplified set of principles, and less toward detailed written norms, 
rules and regulations. In order to avoid the costs of institutional dissonances, the decisional bodies will 
tend to adopt that set of standards which is more compatible with the general philosophy of the 
national regulatory framework. More detailed written rules are, more efforts are required to 
incorporate exogenous standards based on a different approach. As a consequence, “convergence 
cannot be achieved if the basis for convergence is a detailed rules-driven approach as this will be 
difficult to roll out across the different jurisdictions and cultures around the world” (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 2006:3). Due to the costs of institutional adjustments, 
supplementary obstacles for IFRSs adoption can appear if the legislative systems are characterized by 
a higher degree of complexity with various regulations issued by different channels and subjects of 
frequent changes. 
According to this type of arguments, at least two research hypotheses may emerge: 
H1: The preference of regulators from an individual country to adopt IFRSs will increase with the 
predominance of a principles-based general legislative system and 
H2: The preference of regulators from an individual country to adopt IFRSs will decrease as the 
autochthonous legislative system is more characterized by complex formal rules, norms and 
regulations which are characterized by high heterogeneity and frequent changes.   
 
2. LEGISLATIVE FAMILIES 
 
The IFRSs adoption is a complex process involving public authorities, professional bodies or joint 
structures. The preferences of these entities to adopt the standards depend on a complex set of factors, 
including inter alia the general preferences for formal codification of the legislative systems. Thus, the 
nature of the regulatory societal framework, being synthesized by the characteristics of the “legislative 
families” is expected to influence the context, amplitude and effects of IFRSs adoption.  
The concept of „legislative families” was introduced within the comparative law at the beginning of 
the 19th century; 1900 being the year of the first international comparative law congress. 
Subsequently, different criteria have been suggested in order to perform a typology of the judicial 
systems, their classification being essentially an academic instrument, but also useful to any person 
wanting to capitalize it as a comparative argument.  
The estimation criteria regarding the affiliation of a jurisdiction to a legislative family or another, have 
varied along history, starting from those of geographical and religious type (Esmein, 1905) to those 
which had in view race (Sauser-Hall, 1913), historical origins (Sarfatti, 1933), the contents of the law 
(Arminjon et al., 1951), and, last but not least, the judicial style (Zweigert and Krotz, 1998). These 
have proven to be useful instruments that should go through with the diversities of the judicial 
systems, being materialized in the identification of a number of legislative families in which the 
judicial systems could be integrated.  
Viewing such classifications of the legislative families as being out-of-date, Mattei (1997), starting 
from the judicial theory and sociology of Max Weber, distinguishes three types of norms that affect 
mankind behaviour, especially focusing on the origin sources of the legal norms. He divides the law 
sources in three main groups, these having political, judicial, philosophical or religious tradition. The 
author is the sympathizer of the idea according to which each judicial system presents various 
characteristics, but one of them being dominant. The suggested classification distinguishes between 
rule of professional law, rule of political law and rule of traditional law. Within the structure of the 
professional law rule is mixed with the common law and Roman-German law, in which the areas of 
the political and legal decisions are separated. Moreover, law is very secularized. In the rule of 
political law group, the legislative processes are greatly correlated with the political relations, the 
group including the law systems from the Former Soviet Union and some Asian systems. Within the 
integral part of the traditional law rule, the author includes those systems in which the philosophical 
and religious traditions make common body with the law (for instance, the law of Islamic countries, 
Hindu law and Asian law).  
In a similar manner, Vanderlinden (1995) looks critically upon the old classifications performed in the 
case of the legislative systems, suggesting a new alignment for them in terms of judicial theories and 
emphasizing five law systems: common, doctrinarian, jurisprudence, legislative law and the system of 
revelation.  
Common law refers to those judicial systems in which customs are determined by certain groups of the 
society in order to create certain normative beliefs regarding the judicial obligations. The doctrinarian 
systems incorporate those deriving from other judicial systems, as the Roman-Dutch in South Africa 
and Sri Lanka, in which old doctrine of foreign origin is continued in a specific shape. The 
jurisprudence systems are those which have their historical origin in the English judicial thinking, the 
focus being on the judicial practice. The legislative systems are those in which the written codified law 
represents the main law source, essentially including the Roman-German systems. The systems of 
revelation are those which give major importance to divine revelation, on these grounds being 
determined the general legal framework in a subsidiary manner. Among these systems, we can find the 
Islamic law, Hindu law but also the Biblical law.  
Although the identified judicial systems are somehow similar to one another, being based on similar 
cultural and operational traditions within the context of certain similar social, economic and political 
conditions, the approached legislative families did not answer absolutely to the challenges generated 
by the judicial culture and mentality, within the context of a lack of cooperation with areas such as 
judicial sociology, history of law or anthropology (Gessner et al, 1996).As a result, one of the most 
recent steps in the evolution of the legislative family approaches has brought into attention the so-
called “third judicial family” and the idea of mixed judicial systems. The term “mixed” must be 
construed restrictively, so that this category defines the case in which two or more systems apply 
cumulatively or interactively.  
For instance, Palmer (2001) underlined the idea that mixed jurisdictions represent in fact the third 
major judicial family alongside of common law and Roman-German law. Currently, there are some 
attempts of creating an approach referring to the “family trees”- Örücü (2004) - the main object being 
the attempt of demolishing the conventional model of the judicial systems and creating their 
reconstruction in which the judicial systems should be classified according to their filiations and 
constitutive elements. However, there are other attempts of renewing the old tradition of the judicial 
families as well (Reyntjens, 1991 and Heiss, 2001). 
Our view is that the analysis of the various concepts met in literature allows us to conclude that each 
judicial system tends to acquire special characteristics in accordance with the respective jurisdictions 
and populations, despite the affiliation to the same judicial family.  
Hence, civil law is currently the judicial system met in most of the world countries, its primary source 
being legislation, the normative judicial acts (especially codifications). These codes are mainly 
characterized by a high level of generalization which allows judges to construe and analyze the whole 
practical circumstances, either by applying the law or by completing the gaps through extrapolation.  
Within civil law, four distinct groups can be identified: (a) French civil law, which is applicable in 
France, Benelux, Italy, Romania, Spain and former colonies of these countries; (b) German civil law, 
which is applicable in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, former Yugoslavian republics, Greece, 
Portugal, Turkey, Japan, South Korea; (c) Scandinavian civil law, which is practiced in Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland;  (d) Chinese legislation, a mixed civil and socialist law, 
utilized in People’s Republic of China.  
What differentiates the essential judicial system of common law from other judicial systems is the 
explicit recognition of the decision ordered by legal courts as a primary source of law; being a system 
based on induction in which the judicial concepts are the result of a consequent jurisprudence which 
defines the application areas. Within the context of the express recognition of the judicial precedent as 
a legal source, the decisions ordered by the higher courts become compulsory for the inferior courts. 
However, in certain jurisdictions, the state reserves the right of proceeding to the annulment of the 
judicial decisions and the performance of a codification, taking into consideration that there are 
multiple conflicting or ambiguous judicial decisions.  
Common law is currently practiced in Ireland, major part of United Kingdom (England, Wales and 
North Ireland), Australia, India (excepting Goa), and Pakistan, South Africa, Canada (excepting 
Quebec), Hong Kong, United States of America (excepting Louisiana) and many other places. In this 
context, there could be emphasized significant differences between the positive legislations from 
United States, Great Britain and Australia, for instance (countries belonging to the common law 
judicial family) but not less substantial are the differences between the positive laws from France, 
Germany and Chile, for instance (countries belonging to the civil law judicial family). Regarded as a 
complex of traditions and customs which, in time, have become law, common law can develop based 
on religion, ethnicity or cultural identity. It has sometimes an important significance in the matter of 
the personal state in a significant number of countries with mixed judicial systems which tend to apply 
to “common laws” under the shape of the codes. This is specific to a number of African countries but 
it’s also the case of China or India, for instance, but in very different conditions. The Islamic judicial 
system is an autonomous system of religious nature, explicitly based on religious principles, 
predominantly on Koran. The main source is the saint book, the Koran, which completes the Sunna, a 
collection of facts and speeches of the Prophet. The religious law is intended to regulate the whole 
aspects if the society and the lives of its members. One of the distinctive characteristics of the Islamic 
law is the fact that the rights of the community are above those of the man, the individual rights and 
freedoms being restricted by moral, religious and divine imperatives. The system is used in countries 
with Islamic tradition, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates or Morocco, where moral norms recently tend to be interpreted in a broader sense, in order to 
adapt them to the contemporary realities.  
No doubt, the existence of the mixed judicial families allows the prominence of more law systems 
which can find applicability simultaneously regarding the same political entity. These include two or 
more legislative systems interacting in a multicultural and multi-religious society, being sometimes 
applied complementarily. The judicial systems from various countries in North Africa or Middle East 
are strongly influenced by the civil law tradition but, in certain fields - especially in those affecting the 
individual and family rights and the property rights - the structure of this system tends to follow the 
Islamic tradition. 
Taking into account these distinctive features of legislative families, our research hypotheses can be 
unified in a single main one as: 
H: The preference of regulators from an individual country to adopt IFRSs will increase as the 
autochthonous legislative system is closer to Common Law and Civil Law mono-systems. 
 
  
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to test our hypothesis, we have constructed two dummy variables: IFRSs dummy and, 
respectively, legislative families dummy for 162 jurisdictions according to current available 
information. The first dummy is designed to reflect several stages of IFRSs adoption. Thus, it can take 
the following values: “0”- if IFRSs are not permitted/ not mentioned by the relevant legislation and no 
de facto compliance can be observed; “1” if IFRSs are permitted for listed companies (individual and 
consolidated financial statements) but the international standards are not compulsory; “2” - IFRSs 
required for some listed companies (e.g. large companies, financial institutions and so on); “3”-  IFRSs 
required for all listed companies both for individual and consolidated financial statements. Since the 
identification of different intermediary situations is sometimes difficult, data are compiled from 
various sources, mainly Deloitte (2010), PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2010), and Financial Standards 
Foundation (2010) websites. These are completed by Ernst&Young (2010), ISAR/ UNCTAD (2010), 
International Monetary Fund (2010) and World Bank (2010b), as well as by documents of regional 
organizations such as OHADA (2000). In our dataset, for 37% of the included countries IFRSs are not 
required nor permitted for quoted companies. For 4.9%, IFRSs are permitted while for 10.5% of cases, 
IFRSs are required for some companies. Only in 47.6% of cases, the international standards are 
required for all companies. 
On the website of the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa with the help of the Supreme Court of 
Canada Library on “world’s legal systems”, the categories of legal systems are divided into: civil law, 
common law, customary law, Muslim law and mixed law (University of Ottawa, 2010). We find in 
these categories countries in which two or more legal systems apply concurrently or interactively, as 
well as those in which systems are rather juxtaposed because they apply to more or less clearly distinct 
fields. According to this source, “mixed systems” appear in the following categories: mixes of civil 
law and common law (3.47% of the world population); civil law and customary law (28.54%); civil 
law and Muslim law (3.14%); common law and customary law (2.94%); common law and Muslim law 
(5.25%), civil law, Muslim law and customary law (3.62%); common law, Muslim law and customary 
law (19.17%); civil law, common law and customary law (0.8%); common law, Muslim law and civil 
law (0.23%); and of civil law, common law, Muslim law and Jewish law (0.09%). The number of 
jurisdictions that fall into the “mixed systems with civil law” category is 65 (19.12% of the world’s 
legal systems), “mixed systems with common law” are 53 (15.59 %), “mixed systems with customary 
law” are 54 (15.88%) and “mixed systems with Muslim law” are 33 (9.70 %). Thus, our dummy 
variable for legislative families can take values from 1 to 27. 
The main statistic properties of the data are listed in Table 1. The values of dispersion, the non-normal 
distribution and the presence of the fat tails effects suggest that there is an important degree of data 
heterogeneity. Thus, it is necessary to employ an estimation method robust to such heterogeneity. We 
appeal to the Generalized Linear Models (GLM) estimation framework. This methodology allows 
flexible specifications of the model and “for non-normal data without clustering, generalized linear 
models are an appropriate alternative to linear models” (Tuerlinckx et al. 2006:225). 
Details on this methodology are provided in Appendix. The general specification of the model is non-
linear of the form: 
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Such a specification falls into the GLM framework with a log link function and Poisson family 
distribution (see Appendix). X represents other explanatory variables included together with the 
legislative families’ dummy. The specification can be justified by the complexity of involved 
associations between the type of legislative families and IFRSs adoption. Indeed, it seems implausible 
that the effects induced by the legislative institutions and practices can affect the adoption processes in 
a linear fashion. 
 
4. RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
The scatter diagram from Figure 1 clearly indicates a negative association between IFRSs adoption 
and legislative families’ dummies. Still, a more analytical approach is needed. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the standalone GLM estimation. It appears that the type of legislative 
families exercises a significant influence of 1% to IFRSs adoption. The negative sign suggests that this 
influence is more in favour of boosting up the adoption as the legislative structures are closer to simple 
civil and common law systems. 
A first way to check the robustness of these results can consist in taking into account some control 
variables. We first consider the “rule of law” variable as this is captured in the methodology proposed 
by  Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) and reported by Worldwide Governance Indicators World 
Bank’ project (WGI) (2010c). There are several transmission channels through which the rule of law 
can support the IFRSs adoption. For instance, we may argue that the investor’s demand for fair value 
information and a company’s commitment to transparency increase the likelihood of providing such 
information by taking into account the requirements of IFRSs. There is some recent empirical 
evidence to support this thesis (see Muller et al., 2008). One possible argument for such a linkage is 
that the increase of disclosure levels as a consequence of IFRSs adoption can enforce the corporate 
reputation (Espinosa Blasco and Trombetta, 2004), improves the market liquidity (Verrecchia, 2001), 
and lowers company’s cost of capital (Healy and Palepu, 2001, Core, 2001) and so it can provide an 
informational rent for owners. 
The pre-existence of a sound legal system, with effective mechanisms of reinforcement for property 
rights and investors protection, can also support higher net inflows of foreign investments. As Hewko 
(2002:3) notes: “a transparent, modern “Western” legal system is a prerequisite for foreign investors to 
venture into host states. The logic of this argument derives from neo-institutional theory of the 
behaviour of economic actors, which maintains that efficient and transparent legal systems reduce 
transaction costs for economic actors, including foreign investors.” Furthermore, the presence of 
foreign investors will exercise a supplementary pressure on local decisional bodies to adopt IFRSs, 
since such an adoption benefits them as well as foreign debtors due at least to: a) reducing the 
information processing cost of foreign investors and b) lowering the effect of other barriers on cross-
border investments such as the geographic distance (Beneish et al., 2010, Yu, 2009). Such channel 
applies both for direct and equity foreign investments (Brüggemann et al., 2009, DeFond et al., 2009). 
Besides the rule of law, we also consider the economic growth as a possible key determinant of IFRSs 
adoption.  
For instance, Archambault and Archambault (2009) document that less economically developed 
countries were also shown to be more likely to allow IFRSs. Ramanna and Sletten (2010) argue that as 
more jurisdictions with economic ties to a given country adopt IFRSs, benefits perceived from 
lowering transactions costs to foreign financial-statement users come to outweigh institutional 
differences. 
Our main argument is that in a pro-growth oriented policy framework, the adoption of IFRSs can 
appear as a “natural” solution considering its various potential benefits. Among others, the adoption: 
a) can improve the activity of capital markets especially in relation to small companies in insider 
economies (Schleicher et al., 2010, Daske et al., 2008); b) can contribute to a decrease in companies’ 
cost of capital and an increase in equity valuations (Daske et al., 2008); c) can strength the authorities' 
responsiveness to risks, prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk management (Financial 
Stability Forum, 2008). All these effects can largely contribute to economic growth and, so, decisional 
bodies can support the IFRSs adoption as a growth engine. Thus, we are expecting that both rule of 
law and economic growth to have a positive impact on adoption processes.  
The outputs of a covariance analysis between IFRSs and legislative families’ dummies and, 
respectively, World Bank proxy for rule of law and real GDP per capita are displayed in Table 2 
(Spearman rank-order covariance) and Table 3 (Kendall’s tau). According with these outputs, it can 
be concluded that as long as the considered transmission channels between the control variables, 
IFRSs adoption and legislative structures can be sustained theoretically, they are also empirically 
valid. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Thus, column 2 of Table 4 reports our empirical evidences for the existence of a significant positive 
effect at 1% of better legislative framework and sustainable growth to adoption. Moreover, the 
robustness can be checked, for instance, by modifying the estimation procedure. The modifications 
might refer to: 1) changes in optimization procedure for GLM framework and 2) changes in 
methodology. 
Thus, column 3 of Table 4 presents the results obtained when the optimization procedure shifts from 
BHHH algorithm to the so-called Quadratic Hill Climbing algorithm. With the exception of minor 
modifications in t-statistics, there are no significant changes in the relevance of considered variables 
with such shift. Column 4 displays the output of quantile regression estimation. Originally proposed 
by Koenker and Bassett (1978), quantile regression provides estimates of the linear relationship 
between regressors and a specified quantile of the dependent variable. One important special case of 
quantile regression is the least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator, which corresponds to fitting the 
conditional median of the response variable. Such method allows a more complete description of the 
conditional distribution than conditional mean analysis alone and, since it does not require strong 
distributional assumptions, it offers a distributional robust method of modelling the relationship 
between different percentiles of dependent and the explanatory variables. We employ a bootstrap 
estimation (10000 replications) based on the Markov Chain Marginal Bootstrap (MCMB) in the 
version developed by Kocherginsky et al. (2005). This version alleviates the autocorrelation problems 
that can appear in the standard version of MCMB by prior transforming the parameter space and after 
the performance of the MCMB algorithm, transferring the results back to the original space. This 
methodology substantially improves the significance of the estimated parameters. 
In addition, we have tested the capacity of our conceptual framework to predict the extreme cases (full 
adoption of current IFRSs). Such choice is justified by the fact that in our dataset only 48% of the 
observed cases represent the last stage of IFRSs adoption, whereas the others count for intermediary 
stages. Thus, it can be argued that, if our model is sound, it should be able to predict the situations of 
full IFRSs adoption and to discriminate between such situation and other stages of adoption. In order 
to perform such test, the IFRSs dummy is transformed in a binary variable according to the next rule: 
1, 3
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The binary estimation is reported in column 5 of Table 4. All the variables are remaining significant at 
1% after the transformation of the dependent variable. The binary equation also allows an estimation 
of the model predictor capacity through the so-called classification table. The fraction of observations 
that are correctly predicted is termed sensitivity, while the fraction of observations that are correctly 
predicted is labelled as specificity. The content of such classification is displayed in Table 5 with 
prediction results based upon expected value calculations.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Such expected values are computed in the left-hand table. For instance, E (Binary_IFRSs = 0) is 
computed as: 
( ) ( ) ( )'Pr _ 0 | , 3i i i
i i
Binary IFRSs x F xβ β= = −∑ ∑  
Here the cumulative distribution function F is for the extreme value distribution:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' 'Pr _ 1 | , 1 (1 exp( )) exp( ) 4i ix xi iBinary IFRSs x e eβ ββ − −= = − − − = −  
In the lower right-hand table, we can compute the expected number of Binary_IFRSs= 0 and 
Binary_IFRSs= 1 observations for a model estimated with only a constant. For this restricted model, E 
(Binary_IFRSs= 0) is computed as n(1-p), where p is the sample proportion of Binary_IFRSs= 1  
observations. A classification is labelled as “correct” when the predicted probability is less than or 
equal to the cut-off (70% in our estimation) and the observed Binary_IFRSs= 0, or when the predicted 
probability is higher than the cut-off and the observed Binary_IFRSs= 1. Overall, the estimated model 
predicts 63.93% of the observations (66% of the observations with dependent = 0 and 61.6% of the 
observations with dependent = 1) correctly. It appears that the levels of sensitivity and, respectively, 
specificity for our model are almost the same, implying that it can discriminate both „extreme” and 
„regular” cases. The gain in the number of correct predictions obtained by moving from the right table 
to the left table provides a measure of the predictive ability of our model. Roughly, there is an 
improvement of 27.69% over the constant probability model with our estimation. The Goodness-of-Fit 
tests, Hosmer-Lemeshow and Andrews, compare the expected fitted values to the actual values by 
group. If these differences are “small enough”, the model is fitting the data adequately. The values of 
these tests, also reported in Table 5, suggest that this is the case with the binary specification. 
Finally, the robustness check concerns the analysis of the major outliers (Table 6).  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
A special discussion should take into account the US GAAP and the convergence process with IFRSs. 
Thus, it worth mentioning that through the Norwalk Agreement in October 2002, FASB and IASB 
committed for the first time to eliminate the differences in the accounting treatments stipulated by 
IASs (International Accounting Standards) and US GAAP (United States General Accepted 
Accounting Principles). In addition, the two Boards decided to co-ordinate their future activities in 
order to ensure that, once achieved, compatibility is maintained. Moreover, in February 2006 (and 
updated in 2008), the Boards released a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) identifying short-
term and long-term convergence projects and setting the steps and milestones towards achieving 
convergence. Recently, as reaction to the pressure exercised by international groups and organizations, 
IASB and FASB reaffirmed their commitment to convergence by issuing a statement outlining steps 
for completing the major joint projects by 2011. To this decision contributed in certain extend the 
standpoint of US SEC in regard to IASB-FASB convergence process, since right from the beginning 
of the economic and financial crisis, the SEC’s decision to drop the reconciliation requirements for 
foreign registrants that adopt IFRSs in full came as a surprise. Till November 2007, the foreign 
companies had two choices: either to prepare US GAAP-based financial statements or to fill a 
reconciliation form of net income and net assets to US GAAP (Form 20-F). Thus, this was the case for 
more than 1.100 non-US companies of the approximately 15,000 companies registered with SEC. The 
cost of such reconciliation for European companies was between 1 and 10 million Euros annually 
depending on their size and field of activity (McCreevy, 2005). However, due to the progress of the 
convergence process, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) dropped these requirements and 
allowed the use of IFRSs as issued by the IASB; by this, meaning the full set of standards including 
the carve-out made by the European Union and the continuous amendments to IFRSs. Moreover, in 
August 2007, SEC launched a public debate on whether or not to allow US domestic issuers to prepare 
IFRS financial statements for the purpose of complying with its rules and regulations. To show its 
clear intentions, in November 2008, SEC published for a proposed “IFRS roadmap”, which outlined 
the milestones that, if achieved, might lead to mandatory transition to IFRS starting December 2014; 
certain entities are allowed to adopt IFRS in advance. In addition, in February 2010, the SEC 
published a Statement in Support of Convergence and Global Accounting Standards aiming to 
facilitate the development and execution of a “Work Plan” that would enable SEC to reach a decision 
regarding the use of IFRSs by US issuers by 2015 /2016. 
Besides U.S. case, with the complex issues of US GAAP / IFRSs convergence, there appears to be 
some outliers in our analytical frame as reported in Table 6. These outliers reflect a variety of 
particular situations. For instance, there are some countries, like Argentina, Mexico, Moldova, 
Thailand,  for which the local standards are partially aligned with IFRSs or had bed developed based 
on previous versions of these, but currently they are unlikely to fully meet the needs of users who 
accustomed to use them (International Monetary Fund, 2010). For others (Belarus, Colombia), there 
are major differences between national standards and IFRSs and no systematic update of local 
practices to reflect the changes in IFRSs (IMF, 2010).  
The Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA) member countries 
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros,  Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, 
Guinea, Bissau Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Togo, Republic Democratic of 
Congo - to be) are subjects of a common accounting system developed under the aegis of the Central 
Bank of Western African States. This system is the traditional reporting methodology in the 
Francophone world. It provides a chart of accounts that needs to be adhered to in the preparation of the 
financial statements. The OHADA system incorporates some elements of IFRSs, but it is far to the 
complete compliance. The OHADA accounting system is applicable to both private and public 
businesses. Only entities that are subject to public sector accounting rules, such as non-profit entities 
in the public sector, are excluded from the requirements of adopting the OHADA accounting system. 
Banks, financial institutions and insurance companies are also excluded and are governed by sector-
specific accounting plans (OHADA, 2010). 
In 2010, the President of Turkmenistan issued a Decree approving the program for reforming the 
national accounting and audit system during a meeting of the Turkmenistan Cabinet of Ministers, 
which was hold on 9th July 2010. The document was issued to facilitate the implementation of the 
2011-2030 National Social and Economic Development Program of Turkmenistan and bring the 
national accounting and audit system in compliance with international standards and requirements of 
market economy. According to the program, national accounting and auditing standards will be 
developed in compliance with international standards (IFRSs, ISAs) as well as with the specificities of 
Turkmenistan economic system. In accordance with the Decree, all enterprises, institutions and 
organizations irrespective of the form of ownership (except for banks) from January 1st, 2013 are to 
ensure phased transition and from  January 1st, 2014 the full transition of the national accounting and 
audit system to IFRSs; from January 1st, 2011 the banking institutions in the country are to ensure 
transition to IFRSs, prepare the financial reports for 2011 in compliance with international standards 
and ensure conducting financial statement audit on a yearly basis in compliance with international 
standards starting from the financial reports prepared for 2011.The measures to be taken in order to 
implement the accounting and audit reform program include updating and developing the relevant 
regulatory framework, training and advanced training specialists and introducing best international 
practice through cooperation with leading financial institutions of the world. 
Accounting standard regulators of the Bank of Cape Verde have recommended the adoption of IFRSs 
in 2008, but, due to many constraints, IFRSs are still not permitted in Cape Verde (Bank of Cape 
Verde, 2009). 
In the case of China, IFRSs are not required or permitted for listed companies. However, the Chinese 
Accounting Standards have largely converged, with some differences still persisting 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2010, Financial Standards Foundation, 2010). World Bank (2009) 
commends China on making “impressive progress” in establishing an institutional framework for 
accounting, auditing and corporate financial reporting. The report reiterates China’s commitment to 
convergence of Chinese Accounting Standards with IFRSs and points out that full convergence is 
expected to be achieved by 2012. In September 2009, the Ministry of Finance issued an exposure draft 
on the “Roadmap for Continuing and Full Convergence” of Chinese standards with IFRSs. So far, in 
November 2010, the Chinese Auditing Standards Board (CASB) completed the revision of Chinese 
Standards of Audit (CSAs) and achieved full convergence with the clarified International Standards on 
Auditing (ISAs). 
For Russian Federation, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) notes that IFRSs are permitted in the 
preparation of consolidated accounts of the listed companies.  Still, it should be noticed that The State 
Duma of the Russian Federation has passed a Law on Consolidated Financial Statements which had 
remained untouched since almost the end of 2004. On December 17th, 2004 the State Duma actually 
allowed the law in the second reading but no attempts to hold the third and final reading of the law 
were made. The final reading of the draft law finally took place on July 7th, 2010, and Russia’s 
President Dmitry Medvedev recently signed it into law. The law applies to banks, insurance 
companies and all companies that have securities accepted to trade at domestic exchanges. It requires 
so that these entities prepare, submit to regulators and publish financial statements in accordance with 
IFRSs. The Law states that IFRSs statements are to be prepared in addition to statements under 
Russian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (Russian GAAP) and not instead of these. The 
requirements formulated in the new Law will come into effect following a formal recognition from the 
Government and Central Bank. The Law does not present a mechanism or a timeline for such 
recognition, but it is expected to take place sometime between 2012 and 2015. Thus, we consider that 
currently IFRSs are not required nor permitted for listed companies. 
Furthermore, commercial banks are required to use IFRSs in the preparation of annual standalone 
financial statements additionally to accounts prepared under Russian GAAP. Publicly available 
information does not indicate any requirements to use IFRSs for preparation of consolidated accounts 
for banks. In general, sources published on the subject point out that progress towards harmonization 
has been slow and Russian accounting standards remain a “summarized” version of the corresponding 
IFRSs (Financial Standards Foundation, 2010). International Monetary Fund (2010) report attributes 
the delay in convergence, primarily, to the emphasis on compliance with tax requirements. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that for these outliers there can be found several political, institutional 
and functional explanations for the fail of our model to correctly estimate the current stage of IFRSs 
adoption. It is interesting to note that these estimation errors are all in the same direction, since the 
model systematically expects for these countries a more advanced level of IFRSs adoption. However, 
a part of these countries had already taken different steps towards IFRSs adoption / national standards 
convergence. 
Overall, we view these results as providing some empirical support for our research hypothesis by 
highlighting the preference of Common Law and Civil Law countries to adopt in full the IFRSs. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We hypothesize that countries which are characterized by principles and practices-based legislative 
systems are more likely to adopt IFRSs. In order to test such hypothesis, we have constructed, for a 
dataset of 162 jurisdictions, dummy variables designed to capture the current stage of IFRSs adoption 
and, respectively, the taxonomy of their legislative systems. We have tested the linkages between such 
variables inside a GLM framework and obtained robust evidences that the full adoption of IFRSs is 
more likely to occur for countries with mono-systems of Common Law and Civil Law types. Thus, we 
conclude that a flexible, homogenous and practices oriented general legislative system can be a 
prerequisite for a smooth and complete IFRSs adoption. We also find that a strong rule of law, with an 
effective mechanism of property rights reinforcement, can contribute to a faster IFRSs adoption. Such 
result does not necessarily contradict other findings in literature, since the IFRSs adoption can be 
viewed as an expression of the overview concern of decisional bodies to support the quality of contract 
enforcement, the property rights and the social order and not only as a tool for the compensation of the 
national legislative framework’ deficiencies. Similarly, it appears that the pre-adoption existence of a 
pro-growth set of public policies can facilitate the IFRSs adoption. Of course, the significance of our 
analysis depends on the relevance of the considered transmission channels which are far from being 
completely and consistently described on a conceptual level and perfectly robust empirically tested. 
However, the provided evidences can contribute to enhance a broader explanatory framework of the 
conditions in which there is a clear preference of regulatory bodies to adopt international standards. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
Table A.1. Dependent and explanatory variables 
Variable Description Source 
IFRSs 
dummy 
Dummy taking the next values: 
- “0” if IFRSs are not permitted / not 
mentioned; 
- “1” if IFRSs permitted; 
- -“2” IFRSs required for some companies; 
- “3” IFRSs required for all companies. 
Coded by authors based on Deloitte (2010), 
Price WaterhouseCoopers (2010), 
Ernst&Young (2010), Financial Standards 
Foundation (2010), World Bank (2010b), 
International Monetary Fund (2010), ISAR/ 
UNCTAD (2010), OHADA (2000) data 
Legislative 
families 
dummy 
Captures the typology of the legislative 
families (for a more detailed description, see 
Table A.2.) 
Coded by authors based on University of 
Ottawa (2010) 
Rule of law 
Captures perceptions to the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. 
World Bank (2010a) 
Real GDP 
per capita 
Real GDP per capita (log) (US dollars at 
constant prices and exchange rates-2000) 
UNCTAD (2010) 
 
Table A.2. Legislative families 
Codification Description 
                         Simple legal families 
1 Civil Law (mono-system) 
2 Common Law (mono-system) 
3 Muslim Law (mono-system) 
4 Customary Law (mono-system) 
                      Mixed legal families 
(Hybrids with civil law, common law, Muslim law or customary law in different combinations) 
5 Hybrids with Civil Law and Muslim Law 
6 Hybrids with Civil Law and Customary Law 
7 Hybrids with Civil Law and Common Law 
8 Hybrids with Civil Law, Common Law and Customary Law 
9 Hybrids with Customary Law and Common Law 
10 Hybrids with Customary Law and Civil Law 
11 Hybrids with Common Law and Customary Law 
12 Hybrids with Common Law and Civil Law 
13 Hybrids with Common Law and Muslim Law 
14 Hybrids with Muslim Law and Common Law 
15 Hybrids with Muslim Law and Civil Law 
16 Hybrids with Muslim Law, Civil Law  and Customary Law 
17 Hybrids with Muslim Law, Common Law and Customary Law 
18 Hybrids with Muslim Law, Civil Law, Common Law and Customary Law 
19 Hybrids with Civil Law, Muslim Law and Customary Law 
20 Hybrids with Civil Law, Customary Law and Muslim Law 
21 Hybrids with Common Law, Muslim Law and Customary Law 
22 Hybrids with Civil Law, Common Law, Jewish Law and Muslim Law 
23 Hybrids with Customary Law and Muslim Law 
24 Hybrids with Common Law , Civil Law and Customary Law 
25 Hybrids with Muslim Law, Customary Law and Civil Law 
26 Hybrids with Civil Law, Common Law and Customary Law 
27 Hybrids with Civil Law, Customary Law and Common Law  
 
APPENDIX GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS 
Originally due to Nelder and Wedderburn (1972) and Wedderburn (1974), Generalized Linear Models (GLM) 
(the term and especially the abbreviation should not be confused with the so-called General Linear Model) are a 
rich and flexible framework for the generalization of ordinary least squares regression. 
Let Yi , i=1,2,…N , independent response variables each of whose conditional mean depends on k-vectors of 
explanatory variables and unknown coefficients β. Yi may be decomposed into a systematic mean component, μi, 
and a stochastic component, εi, such as: 
( ).1.i i iY aμ ε= +  
The standard linear regression models assume that μi is a linear predictor formed from the explanatory variables 
and coefficients 'i iXμ β= , and that εi, is normally distributed with a zero mean and a constant variance, 2iV σ= . 
In contrast, GLM models allow the mean component to depend on a linear predictor through a nonlinear 
function, and the distribution of the stochastic component to be any member of the linear exponential family. 
Such models consist of three components: 
1) A random component, specifying the conditional distribution of the response variable, Yi (for the ith of n 
independently sampled observations), given the values of the explanatory variables in the model. In Nelder 
and Wedderburn (1972) original approach, the distribution of Yi is a member of an exponential family, such 
as the Gaussian (normal), binomial, Poisson, gamma, or inverse-Gaussian families of distributions. 
However, further developments have extended GLM to multivariate exponential families (such as the 
multinomial distribution), to certain non-exponential families (such as the two-parameter negative-binomial 
distribution); 
2) A linear predictor or index 'i iXη β θ= +  with θ being an optional term. The regressors X may include 
quantitative explanatory variables, transformations of quantitative explanatory variables, polynomial 
regressors, dummy regressors, interactions, and so on; 
3) A smooth, invertible link function g(.), ( )i ig μ η= , relating the mean and the linear predictor. Because this 
function is invertible, there can also be written as: ( )1i igμ η−= . 
Taken together, all these elements allow the general formulation of the GLM: 
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Here Vμ(μ) is a distribution-specific variance function describing the mean-variance relationship, the dispersion 
constant Ф > 0 is a possibly known scale factor, and wi > 0 is a known prior weight that corrects for unequal 
scaling between observations. 
A straight interpretation of the relations (a.2.) is that in a GLM frame, the properties of the estimators depends 
only on a mean and variance, where the mean is determined by the link assumption, and the mean-variance 
relationship is governed by the distributional assumption. Thus, the assumptions on distributions made in this 
framework can appear to be overly restrictive. This limitation is treated by Wedderburn (1974) who shows that 
one need only specify a mean and variance specification to define a quasi-likelihood that may be used for 
coefficient and covariance estimation. It should be noticed that, for variance functions derived from exponential 
family distributions, the likelihood and quasi-likelihood functions are the same. 
A wide range of familiar models may be formulated in the form of a GLM by an appropriate choice of 
distribution and link function. 
In our settings, we are taking into account the characteristics of the fitted data. Firstly, due to the data 
heterogeneity, we are choosing for distribution the Poisson distribution which can be applied to systems with a 
large number of possible events, each of them being rare. The Poisson distributions are a discrete family with 
probability function indexed by the rate parameter μ > 0: 
( ) ( ) ( )exp, , 0,1, 2... .3.
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The expectation and variance of a Poisson random variable are both equal to μ. As μ increases, the Poisson 
distribution grows more symmetric and is eventually well approximated by a normal distribution. 
Secondly, we involve a log link function- log (μ). Such a choice is motivated by the concern about the ensuring 
range restrictions on fitted mean. Since Poison distribution requires a positive mean value, the log family (as 
well others like power or Box-Cox ones) can be seen as more appropriate. In order to estimate the models, we are 
involving a common technique- the so-called Gauss-Newton / BHHH (Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman). This 
method replaces the negative of the Hessian by an approximation formed from the sum of the outer product of 
the gradient vectors for each observation contribution to the objective function. For least squares and log 
likelihood functions, this approximation is asymptotically equivalent to the actual Hessian when evaluated at the 
parameter values which maximize the function. At the same time, for robustness check purposes, we also involve 
in estimation the Quadratic hill-climbing technique which is a straightforward variation on Newton-Raphson 
approach. The technique adds a correction matrix (or ridge factor) to the Hessian in order to “push” the 
parameter estimates in the direction of the gradient vector. The correction may provide better performance at 
locations far from the optimum, and allows for computation of the direction vector in cases where the Hessian is 
near singular. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of legislative families and IFRSs adoption 
 Legislative families dummy IFRSs adoption dummy 
Mean 5.45 1.69 
 Median 2.00 2.00 
 Maximum 27 3.00 
 Minimum 1 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 5.86 1.39 
 Skewness 1.32 -0.26 
 Kurtosis 3.87 1.22 
 Jarque-Bera 52.31 23.43 
Cross-section observations 162 162 
 
Table 2. Covariance analysis of IFRSs adoption dummy and explanatory variables - Spearman rank-order 
covariances 
  
  Covariance Correlation t-Statistic Probability 
Legislative families dummy IFRSs adoption dummy -839.82 -0.43 -6.08 0.00 
Rule of law IFRSs adoption dummy 979.93 0.49 7.03 0.00 
Rule of law Legislative families dummy -417.69 -0.20 -2.55 0.07 
Real GDP per capita IFRSs adoption dummy 849.58 0.42 5.87 0.00 
Real GDP per capita Legislative families dummy -607.15 -0.29 -3.79 0.00 
Real GDP per capita Rule of law 1820.79 0.83 18.64 0.00 
Notes: Included observations: 162; Dunn-Sidak multiple comparison adjusted probabilities; the test statistics and 
associated ρ-values reported are meant to test the hypothesis that a single correlation coefficient is equal to zero; 
degree of freedom adjusted. 
 
Table 3. Covariance analysis of IFRSs adoption dummy and explanatory variables - Kendall’s tau measures of 
association 
  
  tau-b tau-a Score (S) Concordance Discordance Probability 
Legislative families 
 dummy IFRSs adoption dummy -0.37 -0.26 -3357.00 1766.00 5123.00 0.00 
Rule of law IFRSs adoption dummy 0.37 0.30 3873.00 6027.00 2154.00 0.00 
Rule of law Legislative families  dummy -0.14 -0.13 -1636.00 4335.00 5971.00 0.08 
Real GDP per capita IFRSs adoption dummy 0.32 0.26 3333.00 5757.00 2424.00 0.00 
Real GDP per capita Legislative families  dummy -0.21 -0.18 -2378.00 3964.00 6342.00 0.00 
Real GDP per capita Rule of law 0.64 0.64 8355.00 10698.00 2343.00 0.00 
Notes: Included observations: 162; Dunn-Sidak multiple comparison adjusted probabilities; the test statistics and 
associated ρ-values reported are for testing the hypothesis that a single correlation coefficient is equal to zero; degree 
of freedom adjusted. 
 
Table 4. IFRSs adoption and legislative framework 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Figures in bracket represent the t- 
statistic; For the Generalized Linear Model estimations: a) Family: Poisson; b) Link function: Log; c) Optimization 
algorithm: BHHH (Model 2) and, respectively, Quadratic Hill Climbing (Model 3); For Quantile Regression 
estimation: a) Coefficient covariance: Bootstrap (10000 replications); b) Sparsity estimation: Siddiqui (mean fitted) - 
bandwidth method: Hall-Sheather (size parameter: 0.05); c) Random generator: Knuth; d) Bootstrap method: Markov 
Chain Marginal (as modified by Kocherginsky et al., 2005); for Binary equation: binary choice- extreme value model;  
Included observations: 162. 
 
Table 5. Expectation-Prediction Evaluation for Binary Specification     
 Model 1 
(Generalized 
Linear Model- 
constant 
included) 
Model 2 
(Generalized 
Linear 
Model- 
BHHH) 
Model 3 
(Generalized 
Linear 
Model- 
Quadratic ) 
Model 4 
(Quantile 
Regression) 
Model 5 
(binary 
equation- 
dependent: 
binary IFRS) 
Legislative families 
dummy 
-0.09*** 
(5.27) 
-0.05*** 
(4.22) 
-0.05*** 
(3.68) 
-0.07*** 
(4.34) 
-0.07*** 
(3.68) 
Rule of law  0.23*** 
(2.78) 
0.23*** 
(3.23) 
0.54*** 
(7.22) 
0.63*** 
(4.28) 
Real GDP per capita  
(20 years moving 
average) 
 0.08*** 
(7.08) 
0.08*** 
(7.74) 
0.21*** 
(11.30) 
0.09*** 
(4.15) 
             Estimated Equation            Constant Probability 
 Binary_IFRSs dummy=0 
Binary_IFRSs 
dummy=1 Total 
Binary_IFRSs 
dummy=0 
Binary_IFRSs 
dummy=1 Total 
E(Binary_IFRSs = 0) 56.15 29.58 85.73 44.60 40.40 85.00 
E(Binary_IFRSs = 1) 28.85 47.42 76.27 40.40 36.60 77.00 
Total 85.00 77.00 162.00 85.00 77.00 162.00 
Correct 56.15 47.42 103.57 44.60 36.60 81.20 
% Correct 66.06 61.59 63.93 52.47 47.53 50.12 
% Incorrect 33.94 38.41 36.07 47.53 52.47 49.88 
Total Gain* 13.59 14.06 13.81    
Percent Gain** 28.59 26.80 27.69    
 
 
Notes: *Change 
in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification; **Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected 
by equation; For Goodness-of-Fit Evaluation tests: Grouping based upon predicted risk (randomized ties).; Success if  
probability is higher than 70%.  
             
Table 6. Outliers in estimations 
Country IFRSs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Binary equation 
Argentina 0 3 2 2 2 <3 
Belarus 1 3 2 2 2 <3 
Cambodia 0 3 2 2 1 <3 
Cape Verde 0 3 2 2 2 3 
China 0 2 2 2 1 <3 
Colombia 0 3 2 2 2 <3 
Comoros 0 2 2 2 1 <3 
Equatorial Guinea 0 2 2 2 1 <3 
Gabon  0 2 2 2 2 <3 
Mexico 0 3 2 2 2 <3 
Moldova 0 3 2 2 1 <3 
Russian Federation 0 3 2 2 2 <3 
Thailand 0 3 2 2 2 3 
Turkmenistan 0 3 2 2 1 <3 
United States 0 2 3 3 3 3 
 
Figure 1: Scatter Plot of IFRSs adoption dummy vs. Legislative families dummy 
Hosmer-Lemeshov 
Statistic 3.05  Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.93 
Andrews Statistic 8.04  Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.63 
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